Iraq Economic News and Points To Ponder Friday Morning 10-10-25

The Biggest Corruption Disaster In Iraq's History: $35 Billion Is "Stolen" Annually, And $775 Billion In Losses Are "Without A Trace."

Five National Budgets   Politics / Economy / Special Files Yesterday, 5:00 PM | 11:18  Baghdad Today – Baghdad  Iraq is experiencing what can be described as   an "economy plagued by structural corruption."
 
Corruption is no longer a passing incident  or a deviation in administrative behavior,  but has become an integral component of the power equation  and a hidden driver in political and economic decision-making circles.

Monitoring and research estimates indicate that  Iraq has lost more than $600 billion over two decades  due to administrative and financial corruption,   at a time when actual spending on  infrastructure,  education, and  health  did not exceed 20% of total oil revenues.
 
However, this tally,  officially announced by former Prime Minister Mustafa Al-Kadhimi in 2023,  only covers the period until mid-2020.
 
This means that the last five years (2021–2025)  remain beyond any comprehensive official disclosure,  despite the accumulation of cases and scandals witnessed by state institutions.
 
According to observers, the continued absence of updated data after 2020  indicates that the corruption hemorrhage is ongoing  and may have worsened in some sectors  that have not yet been subjected to actual scrutiny.
 
If the same annual rate of losses recorded up to 2020,  amounting to approximately $35 billion annually, were adopted, the   subsequent five years (2021–2025) would have added   approximately $176 billion to the total waste and embezzlement.
 
Thus, the estimated total accumulated losses today could exceed $775 billion,    equivalent to five full Iraqi budgets according to 2024 figures.
 
This mathematical equation demonstrates that the  persistence of the corruption structure at the same pace  means that the state has not stopped the bleeding,  but rather shifted it from one stage to another  without a genuine institutional rupture.
 
This makes the   cost of corruption in Iraq escalating over time   and politically complex.
 
This figure alone—even in its incomplete form—  is sufficient to depict the magnitude of the structural crisis that has   afflicted state institutions and   weakened their ability to provide   even the most basic public services,  despite the fact that total oil revenues since 2003 have exceeded $1.2 trillion.
 
This figure summarizes   a horrific gap between realized wealth and development returns,  and between what was collected and what was wasted.
 
Institutional analyses confirm that   these losses represent not only wasted money,  but also lost "political capital."
 
Corruption has impacted public trust in the state   and Iraq's standing   on international integrity indicators,  ranking 140th out of 180 countries in  Transparency International's 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index.
 
This continued decline not only means that corruption persists,  but that it is now measured more by the   extent of the collapse of trust in oversight institutions  than by the amount of stolen assets.

Thus, every reform attempt—no matter how belated—  turns into an existential test for the state itself:
 
Is it still capable of holding itself accountable,  or has corruption become a condition of its political survival?
 
When we talk about $600 billion,  we are not talking about a figure in accounting books,  but rather 3.7 times Iraq's current annual budget,  which amounts to approximately $162.9 billion  according to the 2024 budget law.
 
In other words,  the funds wasted until 2020  were enough to finance Iraq's entire budget for four consecutive years  without exporting a single barrel of oil.
 
If we add the documented cases that occurred after 2020—    most notably the "theft of the century," which alone amounted to $2.5 billion—  the actual losses appear to be much greater than the official figure.
 
Since that year,  no government has released an updated financial statement, and  no cumulative figures have been presented to parliament  regarding the amount of recovered or wasted funds,   meaning that the lost budget has already exceeded the $600 billion ceiling.
 
By simple comparison,  Jordan, with an annual budget of approximately $25 billion,  could have been fully funded for 24 years from these wasted funds.
 
Lebanon, with a budget of no more than $16 billion,   could have covered its public spending for 37 consecutive years.
 
Syria, with a budget ranging between $8 and $10 billion,  could have funded its budget for approximately 60 years.
 
These amounts would be sufficient   to cover Kuwait's $80 billion budget for seven full years.
 
Independent economic estimates indicate that  this figure would be sufficient to build  10,000 modern schools,  1,000 hospitals, and  5,000 integrated housing complexes, as well as  establish a self-sufficient national electricity system, in addition to  water and sewage networks covering all governorates.
 
It is, in essence, a budget for rebuilding a country from scratch,  but it has disappeared into a vortex of  illusory contracts,  shoddy deals, and  political quotas  that have reproduced corruption with each election cycle under new guises.
 
In this context, MP Yasser Al-Husseini confirmed, during an interview with Baghdad Today, that  "the oversight and judicial authorities are proceeding with   one of the most important stages of   combating corruption in Iraq's history, by   referring 22 files that are considered   the most important in our battle against corruption  to the judicial authorities,  including the Public Prosecution,  the Integrity Commission, and the  Board of Financial Supervision."

He added,  "The ball is now in the court of the judiciary,  which has the final say in resolving these cases."
 
Cross-referenced legal readings  confirm that the referral of this number of cases at this time  represents a moment of dual political-judicial pressure.

On the one hand, the current government is trying to demonstrate  its seriousness in combating corruption just one month before the end of its term.
 
On the other hand,  the judiciary finds itself facing a simultaneous test of independence and speed.
 
Legal deliberations indicate that the  value of these referrals is not measured by their number,  but rather by the standing of the individuals and institutions they target,  and the judicial system's ability to overcome the political pressures  that typically accompany major cases.
 
Past experience confirms that most similar cases were closed  under the pretext of "insufficient evidence"  or were transferred to subsequent governments.
 
This means that the true success of these referrals   will not be measured by the announcement,  but by the enforceable judicial ruling.
 
Anti-corruption expert Saeed Yassin Musa told Baghdad Today,  "The lack of serious accountability and   the dominance of political forces over institutions  are the most prominent reasons for the persistence of corruption.
 
The entities or individuals involved in major cases   have not been held accountable,  despite the existence of official documents and reports  proving the extent of the violations and transgressions."
 
Research studies confirm that what Iraq is facing is not "individual corruption,"   but rather an integrated system of influence extending across the  political,  administrative,  financial, and  legal levels.
 
Such that state institutions have become spheres of partisan influence  rather than neutral executive units.

According to public administration studies, the  lack of civil service independence, the  lack of transparency in government contracting, and the  integration of oversight bodies within the party system  have made combating corruption nearly impossible  without radical and comprehensive administrative reform.
 
This is why Musa emphasizes that  "restoring confidence in the Iraqi economy cannot be achieved  without  sincere political will and  firm legal measures  that restore the state's prestige and  halt the drain on public funds that threatens the country's future development."
 
He calls for the implementation of the principle of  "where did you get this from" and the  enactment of laws that protect whistleblowers  and require public disclosure of financial assets.
 
Political assessments unanimously agree that the  timing of the referral of these files—  one month before the elections—  raises suspicion,  not because they are unimportant,  but because they follow years of silence and oversight procrastination.
 
The government, preparing to hand over power,  appears to be seeking to leave a last-minute moral impact  rather than actual reform.

According to modern political approaches,  the fight against corruption is not measured by the extent of its announcement,  but rather by its sustainability.
 
Delayed measures   are not enough to change the general impression in a country  where most citizens believe that selective accountability  has become part of the political game itself.
 
Academic readings indicate that  a state that postpones confrontation  until the moment of farewell  loses the legitimacy of reform  because it chose not a difficult  but a safe time.
 
True reform does not occur when power is at its demise,  but when it is at the peak of its power,  able to confront challenges  without electoral calculations or coalition agreements.
 
The loss of $600 billion—until 2020—  represents a magnifying glass of the structural flaws in the Iraqi state.
 
What makes the picture even bleaker, however,  is that no official disclosure of the new toll has been made in the five years since,  despite the accumulation of major cases that have yet to be opened.
 
This means that the actual figure today   may exceed $7 billion of the total wasted budget.
 
While the referral of 22 difficult cases represents a positive development in form,  its substance will remain dependent on the  judiciary's ability to overcome political will  and apply justice without selectivity.
 
What will decide the battle against corruption in Iraq   is not the number or size of the cases,  but the state's ability to hold itself accountable  before holding others accountable.
 
A state that wastes enough resources to build three neighboring countries,  then refers corruption cases in the final weeks of its political cycle,  is not practicing actual reform  as much as  it is offering a delayed admission of its structural inability to manage accountability in a timely manner.
 
Every missing dollar of those six billion is documentary evidence of the state's absencewhen it should be present as a guarantor of justice and oversight.
 
Every case closed without an enforceable rulingis an embodiment of the continuing imbalance between law and authority,where justice remains deferred in text before being deferred in application.     https://baghdadtoday.news/284866-35-775.html  

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