“Tidbits From TNT” Sunday 1-18-2026

TNT:

Tishwash:  The Iraqi army takes full control of Ain al-Asad base after the American withdrawal.

The Ministry of Defense announced today, Saturday, that the Iraqi army has taken over the management of Ain al-Assad base in full after the withdrawal of American forces.

The Ministry stated in a statement, a copy of which was received by Al-Furat News, that: “The Chief of Staff of the Army, Lieutenant General Abdul Amir Rashid Yarallah, today supervised the distribution of tasks and duties to the military units and formations at Ain al-Assad base, after the withdrawal of the American forces from it and the Iraqi army taking over the management of the base in full.”

He added, "Yarallah was accompanied during the visit by the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army for Operations, the commanders of the (land, air, and army aviation) forces, the Deputy Director of Military Intelligence, the Head of the Security Media Cell, the Director of the Sample Branch, and the Director of the Media Branch. They were received by the Commander of Al-Jazira Operations, the Base Commander, and the Commander of the Second Special Forces Division."

Upon his arrival, Yarallah, according to the statement, followed up on the stages of receiving the security file through his field supervision of the distribution of units and formations within the base, represented by the 65th Special Forces Brigade and its regiments, in addition to the distribution of the headquarters of the Air Force and Army Aviation Commands.

Yarallah also inspected all parts of the base with the aim of securing service facilities, infrastructure, and administrative and logistical aspects, in order to ensure raising the level of readiness to carry out the assigned duties in the best possible way.

In the same context, Yarallah directed the relevant authorities at the base to "intensify efforts and enhance joint work, coordination and cooperation between all units holding the base, and to take advantage of its capabilities and vital location," stressing "the need to work as one team and distribute tasks in a way that ensures the security and protection of Ain al-Assad base, as it is one of the most important military bases within the area of ​​responsibility."   link

************

Tishwash:  A memorandum of understanding was signed between the Development Fund for Iraq and BPI Bank France in Paris.

The Iraqi Embassy in Paris announced the signing of a memorandum of understanding between the Development Fund for Iraq and BPI France in the French capital.

In a statement received by the Iraqi News Agency (INA), the embassy said it participated in the signing ceremony, which was attended by Chargé d'Affaires ad interim, Minister Plenipotentiary Thaer Wahib Hussein.

Hussein emphasized the importance of encouraging companies to enter the Iraqi market and take advantage of available investment opportunities, particularly in the productive and developmental sectors.  link

************

Tishwash:  On Trump's orders, Savaya is in Baghdad: "Complete compliance or total eradication."

 With news of the arrival of US President Donald Trump’s envoy to Iraq, Mark Savaya, today or tomorrow in Baghdad, carrying a “booby-trapped briefcase” of files, sanctions, and what Washington calls “hard gifts,” attention is turning to one of the most complex issues in the Iraqi economy: money smuggling networks, money laundering, and the circulation of hard currency outside legal channels, amid anticipation of the extent of the targeting that may extend to banks, companies, businessmen, and networks linked to armed factions, and what impact this step may have on the stability of the economy, the exchange rate, and the balance of political power internally.

Savaya: An envoy speaking "the language of numbers"

Mark Savaya, an Iraqi-American businessman of Chaldean origin, has served as the US Special Envoy to Iraq since October 2025, with authority directly linking the Iraqi file to the White House. In recent days, he held a series of meetings in Washington, including with US Secretary of Defense Pete Hagseth and the Director of Counterterrorism, before proceeding to the US Treasury Department, where he announced an agreement on a "comprehensive review" of payment records and financial transactions linked to institutions, companies, and individuals in Iraq whose names are associated with smuggling, money laundering, and fraudulent contracts and projects.

Economic and financial expert Ahmed Al-Tamimi believes that this course "reflects an escalating American trend to tighten pressure tools in the near future," explaining to "Baghdad Today" that Washington presents these steps as part of "attempts to protect the international financial system and prevent its exploitation in money laundering operations and financing illegal activities."

From dollar restrictions to selective sanctions

Over the past few years, the United States has tightened restrictions on Iraqi banks' access to dollars through the foreign exchange platform and their dealings with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. This has resulted in limiting the transactions of several private banks and prohibiting others from using dollars, ostensibly to curb currency smuggling abroad. This context makes the new threat brandished by Savaya an extension of an existing pattern, but one more specifically targeting individuals, companies, and networks.

Al-Tamimi explains one aspect of the nature of the potential sanctions, indicating that "the package may include freezing assets, restrictions on bank transfers, and a ban on dealing with financial institutions and companies suspected of involvement in serious violations," which means that some economic entities may suddenly find themselves outside the network of international transactions, or under strict scrutiny that raises the cost of any external activity for them.

Who is the likely target?

Despite the absence of publicly announced regulations so far, the pattern of US sanctions in similar cases allows for an initial outline of the categories likely to be targeted:

- Banks and money exchange companies whose names frequently appear in compliance and money laundering reports, or which have been linked to dollar transfers that were blocked in the past.
- Front companies in the contracting, equipment, and general trading sectors, operating as cover for government contracts or the supply of essential goods, with suspicions that "margins" are being paid to political entities or armed factions.
- Businessmen and financial intermediaries managing a complex network of cross-border transfers and contracts, particularly with countries subject to sanctions or strict monitoring.
- Entities linked to armed factions that are designated or quasi-designated on sanctions lists, whether through security companies, associations, or commercial and media fronts.

In this context, Al-Tamimi points out that "the message is not directed only at the names that will be placed on the list, but at the wider circle around them," because any businessman, bank or company that gets close to this circle will find himself under the microscope of international compliance systems, even if his name is not directly mentioned in the sanctions decisions.

How will Iraq's economy be affected?

Economically, the effects of sanctions are not limited to freezing an account here or banning a bank there; they extend to the image of the Iraqi market as a whole in the eyes of correspondent banks and investors. Al-Tamimi warns that "any expansion of the scope of sanctions will practically lead to even stricter measures by foreign banks, which may resort to what is called 'excessive compliance,' meaning refraining from dealing with Iraqi entities simply for fear of being sanctioned."

This rigidity is reflected in three main ways:

- Increased cost of remittances and foreign trade: The higher the risk factor in dealing with Iraq, the higher the commissions and processing times for remittances, and some transactions may even be rejected outright.
- Additional pressure on the exchange rate: If the flow of official dollars declines, or the number of restricted banks expands, reliance on the parallel market will increase, threatening to erode citizens' purchasing power and widen the gap between the official and parallel exchange rates.
- Slowdown in investments and major projects: International companies will reconsider their plans, especially in sectors where government contracts involve local entities subject to sanctions or suspicion.

The citizen at the heart of the storm: from the dollar to prices

Although sanctions are legally framed as being "targeted" at specific individuals and entities, experience in Iraq, Iran, and Syria over the past years shows that ordinary citizens often bear the brunt of the impact. Al-Tamimi explains that "any disruption to the flow of dollars or tightening of transfers is quickly reflected in the prices of imported goods, from food to medicine and construction materials, because the Iraqi economy is highly dependent on imports."

As costs rise for banks and companies, the burden is gradually passed on to the end consumer through:

- Increased prices for goods and services.
- Reduced job opportunities in sectors affected by sanctions or banking restrictions.
- Restricted access to loans and financing, especially for small and medium-sized enterprises.

In this sense, how the government manages this issue becomes a crucial factor in mitigating the impact of sanctions on the public: the more organized alternatives for trade and finance are available, and the more the parallel market is controlled and monopolies are prevented, the less able speculators are to turn sanctions into an opportunity to profit at the expense of the citizen.

Will politicians be affected and will the equation be disrupted?

Politically, sanctions of this kind have the potential to rearrange some of the balance of power within the Iraqi political system:

Political blocs whose power is largely derived from money may face restrictions on their traditional funding networks, limiting their ability to manage election campaigns, buy loyalties, or finance media and service-oriented outlets.

Some politicians linked to businessmen or banks subject to sanctions may find themselves facing two equally unpalatable options: either attempting to distance themselves from these networks or engaging in a political and media confrontation with Washington, with all the domestic and international costs that entails.

Other forces may exploit the sanctions to present themselves as "less costly" to the West, through reformist rhetoric and promises of financial compliance, thus adding an external dimension to the internal competition.

Conversely, some factions are attempting to downplay the threats from Savaya, with some of their rhetoric even resorting to mockery of any political or economic entity that seriously addresses the sanctions issue or tries to open channels of understanding with it, going so far as to issue veiled threats against anyone who "cooperates" with the American approach.

These messages may discourage some actors from pursuing financial reform, but they do not negate the fact that the sanctions are imposed from abroad, and their cost will affect everyone to varying degrees.

Two parallel paths: sanctions and "surgical" strikes

Another significant indicator, not lost on observers, is the arrangement of Savaya's meetings in Washington: the Treasury Department on one hand, and the Department of Defense on the other. This arrangement, in the view of many, reflects two parallel approaches within the Trump administration's thinking regarding Iraq and the region.

- A financial and punitive track led by the Treasury Department, through reviewing records, tightening compliance, and imposing sanctions on individuals and entities. -
A "surgical" security and military track remains available as a backup option, based on targeted strikes against objectives classified as a direct threat to US interests or those of its partners.

This is a path Iraq has witnessed in recent years through drone strikes or precision missile attacks targeting leaders and positions of armed factions. The difference this time, according to political assessments, lies in Savaya's position itself; he is presented in political circles as Trump's personal envoy, with whom he has a close relationship and a shared business background. This means that his political mandate may be broader than that of a traditional envoy, and that his recommendations on the issues of sanctions and "surgical" strikes will be closer to the decision-making circle in the White House.

Ahmed Al-Tamimi warns that “combining financial and security tools raises the level of risks; if sanctions alone do not bring about the desired change from Washington’s point of view, the appetite for using other tools may increase, and Iraq has experienced this equation more than once.”

A test of the will for reform before it is a conflict with Washington

Ultimately, the "Safaya sanctions" issue is not simply a bilateral conflict between Baghdad and Washington, but rather reveals an internal test of the will for reform in Iraq:

If the government acts swiftly to cleanse the financial system, tighten oversight of banks and companies, and protect the exchange market from speculation, some of the pressure can be contained and transformed into an opportunity to rebuild confidence.
However, if the threat is treated as "merely a passing political maneuver," met only with denials or verbal escalation, Iraq may find itself facing a broader package of sanctions, where the interests of the White House intersect with regional agendas, while the average citizen bears the brunt of the cost at exchange bureaus and on market shelves.

Between these two paths, Washington and its allies will be watching events unfold, just as the Iraqi public is watching the exchange rate, the cost of living, and job opportunities. The difference is that the former possesses the tools of sanctions and "surgery," while the latter can only wait for the results of the numbers game and the decisions made far from its grasp, only to discover later whether it alone will bear the brunt of it, or whether genuine reform will finally begin from within before being imposed from the outside.  link

************

Mot: Finally!!! -- Have Reached Me Seasoned - ""Wonder Years""

Mot: . Its How Ya Says it!! -- LOL !!!